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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of the Study  
Ethiopia is the most populous least-developed country (LDC) outside of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). It is on the process of accession since 2003 and is expected to com-
plete it by 2015. WTO, which gives different options and privileges than regional integra-
tion, bilateral trade agreements (BTAs), and generalized system of preferences (GSP) for 
LDCs in terms of the accession process and its outcome, will have both positive and nega-
tive impacts on Ethiopian economy. Particularly, what the potential implications of ac-
ceding to the WTO will be on the financial service sector of Ethiopia is an interesting 
question since subsequent liberalization commitments will have different impacts on diffe-
rent modes of supply and for different stakeholders i.e. consumers, domestic financial insti-
tutions (FIs) and the government of Ethiopia (GOE).  
This thesis focuses on the impact of Ethiopian accession to the WTO by analyzing if WTO 
based financial liberalization in different modes of supply will have a positive impact on 
Ethiopian financial service sector. Particular attention is given to market access and natio-
nal treatment matters. The financial services sector, which facilitates financial intermedia-
tion, is a key to any properly functioning economy. A healthy and stable financial service is 
essential for sustainable economic growth. Conversely, instability can have economy-wide 
effects and can dramatically cause crisis.1 Especially, in a growing economy that depends 
on the use and flow of its abundant resources, financial services play a vital role in accele-
rating trade and investment, where FIs are needed to supply capital, diversify risk and ab-
sorb shocks.2  
Financial services liberalization generally refers to the removal of discriminatory quantita-
tive or qualitative regulations that discriminate against foreign and domestic financial ser-
vice providers by limiting market entry or commercial presence.3 It addresses the logistics 
of moving and trading services by addressing issues including transparency, regulatory 
                                                
 
1 Kassahun(2012) p.217 
2 Wolla(2013) p.3 
3 IMF(2010) p.10 
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environments, and harmonization of standards with international regulations. It requires 
changes on the “border” and “inside the border” but mainly the amendment of domestic 
legal and regulatory provisions.4 
There are a lot of advantages and risks that can be derived from financial liberalization and 
thus it is important for governments to carefully handle the process by addressing sensitive 
issues like how to raise the capacity of domestic FIs, how to minimize risks associated with 
capital movement, how to direct FIs to address social needs, how to properly regulate the 
sector etc. For Ethiopia, who ranks as one of the poorest performers in the financial service 
sector, these questions should be answered during and after the accession process.5 Neither 
staying closed nor liberalizing without proper oversight are long lasting solutions.  
Financial services liberalization has special meaning for Africa as most African states, have 
fragile and rudimentary financial sectors and how to respond to increased competition is 
their big concern. Moreover, colonial heritage and the interest of trans-national corpora-
tions left highly restricted presence of foreign firms.6 Most African states are also at the 
same stage of economic development and produce similar goods and services and hence 
diversifying their economic base requires linking their outputs with international trading 
regime which requires effective payment, insurance and finance system.7 Ethiopia is no 
exception. However, while expecting banks to boost the economy by providing funds for 
trade and investment; insurance companies to minimize the risk of trading and investment 
and micro-finances to create access to capital for small-scale businesses, the GOE insists 
that the country is not yet ready to liberalize financial services.8 It is also not doing enough 
to improve the sector. 
Ethiopia, whose vision is accelerated and sustained economic growth through industrializa-
tion and transformation to middle income nation,9 requires enhanced and productive ag-
riculture where finance is at the heart of boosting investment and growth by mobilizing 
                                                
 
4 Njinkeu(2008) p.8  
5 The World Bank(2014) p.3 
6 Asongu(2013) p.131 
7 Ibid 
8 Tamene(2014) 
9 MoFED-GTP(2010) P.7 
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scarce financial savings from the public and channeling it to productive investments.10 
Thus, sustainable development is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve without vibrant and 
efficient financial system which is accessible to majority of the population, if not to all.11 
As part of achieving membership in the WTO, Ethiopia will be required to make commit-
ments in the financial services sector. As LDC, Ethiopia is likely to be given some flexibili-
ty in assuming liberalization commitments. However, it will be asked to agree to some 
threshold of liberalization, and it is important for Ethiopia to be prepared to undertake 
commitments and develop a negotiation strategy that protects its interests.12 In addition, to 
respond effectively to the requests of WTO members, it is indispensable for the GOE to 
have thorough information and analyze the potential consequences of liberalization.13  
Experience shows that WTO accession is almost impossible without opening up the finan-
cial sector.14 Across the main 12 WTO services sectors, acceded LDCs have made the most 
comprehensive commitments in financial services.15 Therefore, how to have fine tune fi-
nancial sector liberalization with the necessary legislative and institutional reforms without 
at the same time tearing down legitimate regulatory instruments and risk financial collapse 
is a big challenge.16 Especially, for LDCs like Ethiopia, whose current financial service 
sector is closed,17 it is a daunting but inevitable task to calculate the price of joining the 
world’s biggest trading organization in general and the impact on its financial service sec-
tor in particular. I was interested to write on this subject matter because as an Ethiopian i 
know the problems of Ethiopian financial service sector and believe that it is also up to 
academicians to find solutions by making researches. 
                                                
 
10 Wolla(2013) p.3 
11 ICESDF(2014) p.27 
12 Kassahun(2012) p.209 
13 Bienen(2014) pp.12-13 
14 Asmelash(2014) p.1 All the countries that joined the WTO in accordance with Article 12 including the 7 
LDCs have had to undertake deeper commitments in financial sectors.  
15 Bienen(2014) p.23 
16 Kassahun(2012) p.218 
17 Brenton(2012) p.127 A study made by the World Bank on service liberalization indicated Ethiopia to be the 
most restrictive of all the102 countries studied. 
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1.2 Ethiopian accession so far  
Ethiopia participated in the debate on the problem of commodities regulation in 1956. It 
was one of the countries that responded positively to the 1967 GATT invitation for non-
member LDCs to take part in the work of the Trade Negotiations Committee. It has also 
participated in GATT as an observer since 1984. Such increasingly active participation did 
not however led to Ethiopia’s immediate membership through the Marrakesh agreement.18  
It was in 1997 that the GOE formally applied to be an observer and to initiate accession 
negotiations within a maximum period of five years. The General Council (GC) accepted 
Ethiopia’s application and it was represented at ministerial level. However, Ethiopia missed 
the five-year deadline and sought extension, which was granted in 2002.  
Ethiopia then submitted its formal request for accession in January 2003. At its next mee-
ting in February 2003, the GC accepted the application and established a working party.19 
In 2007 Ethiopia submitted its MFTR and that triggered the bilateral questions and answers 
process. The first working party meeting took place in 2008 and attracted a large number of 
WTO members that already have trade relations with Ethiopia. The participation of these 
states got stronger during bilateral negotiations.20  
Working Party members have submitted over 300 questions regarding Ethiopian MFTR 
and the GOE answered those questions in 2008 and 2009.21 Until December 2012 the wor-
king party has met three times and Ethiopia is now in the process of responding to its fourth 
set of questions.22 Regarding market access negotiations, Ethiopia has submitted its Goods 
offer in February 2012 while services offer is still expected.  
The private sector in Ethiopia particularly the business community feels that their invol-
vement in the accession process has been limited and had not been in consultation as to 
their priorities and needs.23As the targeted beneficiary of this process, concerns about WTO 
accession issues needs to be done at least in consultation with representatives of the private 
                                                
 
18 Desta(2009) p.345 
19 WTO Accessions: Ethiopia(2014) 
20 Desta(2009) p.348 
21 Kenworthy(2010) p.2 
22 Kassahun(2012) p.208 
23 Kenworthy(2010) p.3 
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sector.24Addis and Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce are members of the Technical 
Committee for WTO accession but not represented in the decisive Steering Committee.25  
Ethiopian accession has so far taken 11 years. This is because first Ethiopian transition 
from command to market economy in 1991 and subsequent reform programs were pre-
mature and the country was not ready to make multilateral liberalization that was requested 
by the WTO. After Ethiopia started its accession process, the war with Eritrea (1998-2000) 
was another reason for the delay. Recently, institutional restructuring at the Ministry of 
trade and industry (2012) has been another reason. Moreover, the 2005, 2010 and the 
upcoming 2015 election had protracted the GOE and retarded the pace of the accession 
process. Finally, fear of risk in the financial service sector is the main reason for deliberate 
slowdown by the GOE.26  
1.3 Methodology  
To analyze the impact of liberalization commitments on Ethiopian financial service sector 
legal and economic yardsticks are needed. Therefore, regulation, capacity building, access 
to capital and volatility, improving competition, technology transfer and efficiency are 
used. I chose these parameters because they are also voiced by the GOE and are useful for 
practicability, credibility and proximity reasons.  
I have primarily used relevant national and international legal instruments governing the 
financial service sector. Secondary sources like annual reports, statistics and scholarly wri-
tings are also used. In addition, the experience of recently acceded LDCs (Cambodia, Viet 
Nam and Nepal) whose case better resembles to Ethiopian reality is utilized. Attempts were 
made to see the experience of African LDC members to the WTO. However, there was no 
recently acceded African country whose case could be analyzed to formulate the possible 
outcomes of the accession process for Ethiopia. 
In writing this thesis, I have also faced some challenges. Lack of timely and detailed data 
on Ethiopian financial service sector was the main challenge. In addition, lack of adequate 
                                                
 
24 Kenworthy(2010) p.11 
25 Id, p.17 
26 Tamene(2014) 
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literatures on Ethiopian accession to the WTO in general let alone with regard to the finan-
cial service sector was difficult. On the other hand, this thesis is about an ongoing acces-
sion process and the analysis involves speculation about the negotiation and liberalization 
commitments that Ethiopia might have. However, little is know from the WTO and the 
GOE on how the negotiation is going on so far. Therefore, addressing all possibilities of 
financial sector liberalization scenarios under the WTO and their effect on Ethiopian finan-
cial service sector while at the same time identifying the most feasible ones was not an easy 
task.  
1.4 Outline of the thesis  
This paper is organized into four parts, the first being this introductory chapter. Chapter 
two gives a precise picture of Ethiopian financial service sector by focusing on the banking, 
insurance and microfinance activities. It first analyzes the current reality of Ethiopian fi-
nancial service, which is one of the poorest in the world, and dominated by the banking 
sector and public FIs. It also explores the financial regulatory institution i.e. the NBE and 
shows how its regulatory role is inefficient. It then, shows the laws of the country that go-
vern the financial service sector and their degree of openness which is mostly closed to 
foreigners with variations among different modes of supply. It also discusses the present 
financial regulatory practices of the state that set stringent entry, operational and exit requi-
rements.  
Chapter three deals with the impact of liberalization commitments under the WTO on the 
financial service sector of Ethiopia. For this reason, it first identifies the four basic modes 
of supplying financial services. In addition, the key aspects of GATS for Ethiopian acces-
sion are identified. These are, pro-LDCs objectives, market access, national treatment, 
MFN, transparency, domestic regulation, and payment and transfers. Then, it explores and 
analyzes potential liberalization commitments on different scenarios under each modes of 
supply. It explains, compares and contrasts these commitment scenarios starting from the 
status quo (closed scenario) towards broad liberalization possibilities by considering the 
necessary legal and economic changes. Finally it highlights that the GOE, while acceding 
to the WTO, should simultaneously address corruption; encourage competition; sequence 
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measures properly; utilize RTAs, BTAs and GSPs; involve the private sector; and make the 
NBE focus on regulatory tasks than commercial activities. The last chapter concludes. 
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2 Ethiopian Financial Service Sector 
2.1 Defining financial Services 
‘‘Financial Services’’ generally refer to services provided by organizations (direct finance 
institutions or financial intermediaries) that deal with the investment and management of 
money for commercial and retail customers. They refer to any service of a financial nature, 
which is governed by a measure maintained by authorized party or public body with regu-
latory power.27 Examples are banks, investment funds, insurance companies, microfinan-
ces, estate, trust, agency, securities and stock brokerages.28  
Financial services are defined in the GATS’ annex as "any service of a financial nature 
offered by a financial service supplier", excluding those "services supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authority", which includes "activities conducted by a central bank or mo-
netary authority or any other entity in pursuit of monetary or exchange rate policies". It is 
one of the 12 categories of services with 16 subsectors of its own.29 
Ethiopian laws30 do not define ‘‘financial services’’ but only illustrate FIs that are governed 
by them. Accordingly, insurance, bank, micro-finance, postal saving, money transfer or 
other similar institutions as determined by the NBE are FIs in Ethiopia.  
2.2 Ethiopian Financial Service Sector in a Nutshell  
Financial service sector consists of users, providers of financial services, regulatory laws 
and regulatory institutions.31 Ethiopian financial service sector was reborn in 1991 with the 
demise of command economy and the introduction of free market economy in Ethiopia. 
However, with no capital market and limited shares of private companies, it remains to be 
one of the least developed sectors in the world.  
                                                
 
27 Investopedia Online Dictionary(2014) 
28 Deloitte Center for Financial Sector(2014) 
29 Ghebregergs(2013) P.20 
30 See Banking Business Proclamation art 2(9); Insurance Business Proclamation art 2(12); Micro-Finance 
business proclamation art 6; and NBE establishment (amendment) Proclamation art 2(10) 
31 Stern(2007) p.viii 
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Ethiopia has a population of 87 million and a GDP of 46.87 billion USD32. The service 
sector shares 46.1% of the GDP while the financial service sector roughly accounts for 5%. 
The financial sector is dominated by the banking industry and public FIs.33 (See table 1). 
2.2.1 Banking  
The banking system in Ethiopia consists of a central bank-NBE and Commercial banks.34 
Despite the increase in the number and size of private banks and the restructuring of state-
owned banks, the sector is still dominated by the commercial bank of Ethiopia (CBE).35 
(See table 1).  
Domestic sources (trade and agricultural sectors), particularly from private enterprises 
remained important sources of saving.36Accumulation of large excess liquidity with con-
siderable variation across banks is another feature in Ethiopian banking (See table 1). It 
was particularly high among public banks due to rigid and tightened collateral-based len-
ding practices and inefficient loan delivery systems. This has, nevertheless, recently been 
improving to the extent that some private banks face shortage.37 
With the exception of 2001/02, the banking system and each individual bank have been 
profitable each year since 1997/98. Interest is an important source of income. Currently 
interest rates on deposits, which are subject to a floor set by the NBE, stood 5% while len-
ding rate which is fully liberalized stood at 8.0% for public banks and approximately 1% 
higher for private banks.  
Banking services coverage in Ethiopia is far below international as well as African stan-
dards with low population-to-bank-branch ratio (See table 1). Only 20% of households and 
5% of the rural population have bank accounts or only 14% of adults have access to cre-
dit.38 Consequently, the number of formal banks’ customers is less than 25% of the total 
                                                
 
32 1USD=20.05 ETB, on Nov.1, 2014  
33 NBE Annual Report(2014) p.1 and ECCSA(2013) p.32 
34 Id, p.62 
35 NBE Quarterly Bulletin(2014) p.6 
36 NBE Annual Report(2014) p.62 
37 Id, p.7 
38 World Bank(2014)  
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population, leaving 75% of the population outside of the formal banking sector.39 Simply, 
Ethiopia has one of the lowest financial inclusion-ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Ethiopian banking sector is characterized by high urban concentration of branches and low 
rural banking density (See table 1). The banking sector so far has focused on ‘corporate’ 
finance. Furthermore, credit allocation is skewed towards short-term loans and large-scale 
trade finance in urban areas with a primary objective of private returns.40 
Money and capital markets are not developed and securities markets do not exist in 
Ethiopia except regular market for treasury bills. Government bonds, which are dominated 
by state institutions, are occasionally issued to finance fiscal deficit and to absorb excess 
liquidity. Inter-bank money market operation is very low and rediscount facility is available 
although no bank has so far resorted to this facility due to the existence of excess liquidity 
(See table 1).41 
The efficiency of NBE’s supervision capacity is weak and the banking infrastructure is 
poor. The payment system is rudimentary. It mainly provides basic commercial banking 
products. Innovative products hardly exist and even common services like credit cards, 
ATMs, mobile and Internet banking have been introduced not long ago.42 The banking sec-
tor remains uncompetitive, inefficient and incapable of improving the intermediation of 
private sector savings.  
Generally, Ethiopian banking sector has shown increasing performance over the past twen-
ty years with proliferation of actors and services, and increasing profit and growth-rate. 
Nevertheless, a number of weaknesses are still evident. The accessibility, quality and port-
folio of banking services remain limited. Ethiopian banking industry is monopolistically 
competitive as larger banks are better in their ability to generate more revenue.43 In terms 
of contestability, the sector is incontestable as entry is difficult due to legal, technological 
                                                
 
39 Salah(2014) p.34 
40 Bezabeh(2014) p.34 
41 NBE Annual Report(2014) p.75 
42 Stern(2007) p.14 
43 Salah(2014) p.30 
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and economic factors.44 Besides, information and communication facilities like Ethio-
telecom, which are essential for financial service development, are exclusively held by the 
state, inaccessible and very poor in quality.45  
A micro-data analysis from the annual reports of each bank shows the inefficiency of pub-
lic banks as they have higher cost, smaller interest-spread and lower return of asset.46 In 
addition, there is an implicit policy that public enterprises and government institutions de-
posit their funds and circulate their financial transactions in public banks. Similarly, the 
development bank of Ethiopia (DBE) lends capital selectively to firms in sectors the go-
vernment wants to promote. Moreover, the NBE requires private commercial banks to buy 
government bonds worth 27% of their loan disbursements with 3% interest rate that resul-
ted in tight and expensive credit system for consumers.47 There is also a strict limitation on 
the investment activities of FIs in other FIs and financial activities.  
                                                
 
44 Eshete(2013) p.175 
45 Internet use stood at 8 per 1000, second from the bottom among COMESA members, and 97.8% of the 
population is still offline 
46 Kapur(2012) pp.5-6 
47 Bezabeh(2014) p.26 i.e. Ethiopian measure is estimated to divert about ETB 11 billion (2.4 preferment of 
GDP) from the private to the public sector to cover the government budget deficit.  
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Table 1 Summary of Ethiopian FIs’ Reality in 201448 
 
 
 
Bank 
 
Insurance Microfinance 
Total  Public Private Total  Public  Private   
Share in the finan-
cial service sector 
in % 
80   5   15 
No. Of institutions 19 3 16 17  1 16 31 
No. Of branches  2108 (46.2%) (53.8%) 323 
 
(17.5%
) 
(82.5%) 1244 
Accessibility   20 million deposit 
customers and 
500,000 loan custo-
mers  
(25% of the popula-
tion) 
(CBE 7 mil-
lion account 
holders) 
- 400,000 
clients  
- - 3.6 million clients  
(This covers 15% of 
total  
households or  
20% of the total de-
mand) 
Concentration  52% in eight major 
cities  
(Addis Ababa 33.8%)  
- - Addis 
Ababa 
54.8% 
- - 60% in regional states  
(Addis Ababa 40%) 
Population-to-
branch ratio 
1:41,088 - - 1:269,3
00 
- - 1:69,935 
Asset in USD 165.3 billion  (70% (CBE 
60%)) 
(30%) 339.1 
million 
(18.9%
) 
(81.1%) 1.1 billion 
Capital in USD 1.27 billion  (46.1% (CBE 
35.3%)) 
(53.9%) 94.7 
million 
(21.5%
) 
(78.5%) 224.4 million 
Loan disbursement 
in USD  
6.72 billion (45.2%) (54.8%) 239.4 
million 
(Gross 
market 
pre-
mium)  
- - 708.2 million 
Fresh loan disbur-
sement in USD 
2.7 billion  (61.3%) (38.7%) 13.4 
million 
(Total 
claims 
paid)    
- - 224.4 million  
Saving deposit in 
USD 
11.77 billion (65.7% 
by CBE) 
  11.3 
million 
(Total 
claims 
outstan-
ding) 
- - 508.7 million 
New loan disbur-
sement ratio to 
total deposit  
-  20.7% 27.4%  
 
- - - 44.1% 
Outstanding credit 
in USD 
8.2 billion 52% claim on 
state enterpri-
ses and cen-
95.4% 
claim 
on pri-
- - - 134.7 million  
                                                
 
48 NBE Annual Report(2014) and NBE Quarterly Bulletin(2014)  
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tral govern-
ment 
vate 
enter-
prise  
Domestic sources 
of loan  
90.1% (Private sour-
ces of loan 77%) 
  97% 
general 
insu-
rance 
business 
- - 60% from commercial  
banks and donors  
Important sector  - Agriculture 
84% 
Trade 
sector 
68% 
Life 
insu-
rance 
11.4% 
 
- - Production and petty  
trade49 
Profit in USD  453.8 million 
(52% from interest)  
  Non-
opera-
tional 
income 
30%  
- - - 
Inter-sector in-
teraction 
23 inter-bank money 
market and 0 redis-
count facility since 
1997 
  No 
rein-
surance 
service 
by local 
insu-
rance  
- - - 
 
 
 
                                                
 
49 Bezabeh(2014) p.28 
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2.2.2 Insurance  
Currently, there are 17 insurance companies in Ethiopia with high concentration in urban 
areas especially in Addis Ababa.50 The NBE has also licensed 1054 insurance agents, 26 
insurance brokers, 19 loss assessors, 19 loss adjusters and 1 actuary. Private insurance 
companies in Ethiopia emerged after the 1992’s liberalization measures.51 Their share is 
higher than public institutions and increasing through time even though EIC is the largest 
player in the sector.52 (See table 1). 
Insurance business activities are classified into direct, indirect and auxiliary services all of 
which are available in Ethiopia with the predominance of the first. The Ethiopian insurance 
market is characterized by small risks. (See table 1). Large commercial and industrial risks 
are rare and mostly transferred to foreign insurance companies. However, as of May 1, 
2014, the NBE allowed reinsurance in Ethiopia to enable domestic insurance institutions 
expand their underwriting capacity,53 minimize their cost and dependence on foreign FIs, 
and save foreign currency.54  
Although the share of life insurance in gross-premium has grown steadily, it is still very 
low and that is because of its long-term nature that requires higher degree of consumers’ 
confidence. Insurance companies' investment activities are heavily constrained by lack of 
infrastructure, especially a stock market, and by the restrictions imposed by the NBE that 
requires them to invest majority of their funds in government securities at negative real 
interest rates.  
Generally, the development of the insurance sector in many ways resembles that of the 
banking sector with increasing profit and private sector participation. (See table 1). The 
range of insurance products is limited. Besides, premium setting is based on outdated 
methods, and there is lack of risk assessment methodologies. The regulation of the sector is 
also ineffective. However, contrary to the banking sector, competition is stiff in the insu-
                                                
 
50 NBE Quarterly Bulletin(2014) p.6 
51 Ibid 
52 Asegedew(2013) p.7 
53 Salah(2014) p.4 
54 Directive No.SRB/1/2014 
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rance industry. Private insurance companies’ involvement is better and they are ambitious 
to increase their sales volume and customer base, which often causes aggressive pricing 
policy that led to an unhealthy spiral of premium cutting.55 
2.2.3 Microfinances 
Limited accessibility of banks and high demand for access to finance increases the necessi-
ty for Microfinances in Ethiopia whereby commercial banking is complemented by 31 
micro-finance institutions (MFIs). The GOE has a huge hand in MFIs as their goal is not 
only generating profit but also to fulfill a social objective of incorporating the poor strata 
(mainly rural) of the population into the banking system by creating subsidized low rate 
lending and improving pervasive poverty lending.56 
However, the microfinance sector in Ethiopia has low competition as most of the MFIs are 
considerably smaller while four major public MFIs dominate the asset, capital, saving and 
credit of the system.57 (See table 1). Even if MFIs in Ethiopia are meant for rural consu-
mers who have limited access to banks, they are also concentrated in major cities. (See tab-
le 1). However, the urban-oriented MFIs have not yet been effective in alleviating capital 
shortage and credit access limitations that inbihit the expansion of medium and small-scale 
enterprises.58  
2.3 Regulation of the Financial Service Sector 
2.3.1 Laws 
Ethiopia is a federal state with a parliamentary system of government. Looking at the legal 
system of the country, it follows a civil-law legal system and the Federal constitution is the 
supreme law of the land followed by proclamations enacted by the parliament; regulations 
made by the council of minsters; and directives made by lower organs of the state, respec-
tively. International treaties ratified by the state are also integral parts of the law of the land 
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and are parallel to proclamations. Ethiopian laws, especially directives issued by the NBE, 
play a key role in the regulation of the financial service sector. The NBE has issued more 
than 68 Directives so far. Ethiopia has also concluded more than 58 trade agreements (29 
bilateral) that are relevant for regulation of the sector.59  
Ethiopian laws provide the following regarding the four modes of financial service supply. 
Cross-border supply of financial services is permitted for reinsurance where Ethiopian in-
surance companies can buy reinsurance services from foreign insurance companies subject 
to a limitation to be set by the NBE. Cross-border banking services are also limited to bor-
rowing from abroad by the government, some state-owned enterprises (e.g., Ethiopian Air-
lines), and exporters (without a government guarantee of foreign exchange availability).  
There is no prohibition on ‘consumption abroad’ of financial services, as long as such 
purchase of services complies with foreign exchange regulations. The same is true for Mo-
de 2 sale of financial services, i.e., consumption of financial services by foreigners while 
they are in Ethiopia. 
Regarding commercial presence, financial services are exclusively reserved for Ethiopian 
nationals (natural and juridical persons). Foreigners are prohibited from operating FIs in 
Ethiopia fully or partially.60  
Concerning the temporary movement of natural persons, the NBE has foreseen the possibi-
lity to authorize consultants, actuaries, surveyors, loss assessors and loss adjustors that have 
already been licensed abroad to give such services in Ethiopia.61  
2.3.2 The Regulator 
There are two distinct but complementary policy discussions on the role of government in 
broadening and deepening access to finance; the modernist approach- which advocates for 
market mechanism in allocating financial resources- and the activist approach that calls 
                                                
 
59 UNCTAD(2013) 
60 Micro Finance Business proclamation art 25; Banking Business proclamation art 9; and Insurance business 
proclamation art 10 
61 Stern(2007) p.99 
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governments to play active role in promoting the breadth and depth of financial services.62 
Particularly in DCs, the latter approach is common with restrictive legal and regulatory 
frameworks that aim at avoiding reckless and corrupt practices. Effective financial sector 
policy combines both approaches in a context-sensitive manner.63 The GOE favors the ac-
tivist approach as evidenced from the speech of former Ethiopian Prime Minster. He said 
that neo-liberal paradigm and associated economic reforms have resulted in a dead-end for 
African development; and he instead called for new beginnings with state activism to 
address developmental and democratic objectives and overcome market failures.64  
The NBE, as a juridical entity, has always been the sole regulator of the financial service 
sector of Ethiopia. Especially after 1991, with the end of socialism and introduction of free-
market economy in Ethiopia, the bank got more powers, inter alia, to license, supervise and 
regulate the operations of FIs.65 It also acts both as a central and commercial bank for the 
GOE.66  
2.3.3 Ethiopian Financial Regulatory practice 
Ethiopian Financial regulatory practice consists of the following entry, exit and operational 
requirements. Based on nationality, Ethiopia prohibits the ownership of FIs by foreign na-
tionals. The number and size of FIs in Ethiopia is not limited. However, FIs are prohibited 
from directly engaging in other financial businesses even though they can hold shares up to 
20% of capital in such businesses. For instance, such total holdings shall not exceed 10% of 
the bank’s net worth or banks may not invest more than 10% of their net worth in other 
securities. The aggregate sum of all investments at any one time (excluding investment in 
government securities) may not exceed 50% of the bank’s net worth; wherein the holding 
of the bank shall not exceed 10% of its equity capital.67 Similarly, regarding the limitation 
on the acquisition of shares, Ethiopian financial laws clearly provide that no person, other 
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than the Federal Government of Ethiopia, may hold more than five percent of FIs’ total 
shares either alone or jointly with relatives of first degree.  
The initial capital requirement is USD 24.9 million for Banks, USD 2.9 million for Insu-
rances and USD 99,750 for Microfinances. Moreover, for banks and insurances, 25% of the 
subscribed capital must be paid and deposited before the commencement of their busi-
ness.68 Besides, banks and insurances must, respectively, deposit 25% and 10% of their 
annual net profit with the NBE.  
Regarding the location and opening of branches, FIs must apply for a permit from the NBE 
and must re-register when savings mobilized reach USD 49,875.3. Permit for operation and 
change of addresses is also mandatory. Regarding legal form, FIs must be established as 
share companies. Insurance-auxiliaries can be individuals whereas corporate brokers or 
surveyors shall be general-partnerships.  
Regarding management structure and qualifications including office term, voting right, age, 
qualification and integrity requirements, Ethiopian laws prescribe the conditions for the 
board of directors and chief executives of FIs. The NBE issues and annually renews FIs’ 
licenses with full discretion. Without written approval by the NBE, FIs must not close, 
change, dispose, restructure, or merge their business. The same is true to undergo bank-
ruptcy, dissolution or liquidation. 
Account opening in foreign currency is limited to establishments and bodies like interna-
tional organizations, diplomatic groups, foreign investors, foreign nationalities working 
with such institutions, foreign citizens of Ethiopian origin and Ethiopians in Diaspora.69 
Ethiopian banks are eligible to open accounts with different banks abroad subject to repor-
ting to the NBE for subsequent registrations. Payment in hard currency among residents of 
Ethiopia is prohibited. However, exporters are given priority to obtain external financing or 
use suppliers' credit. Furthermore, foreign investors can borrow from abroad having regis-
tered at the NBE.70 The NBE is also mandated to observe the transparency of FIs. This in-
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cludes making on-site inspection and checking how FIs keep their records and accounts, 
evaluate their assets and report their activities. 
Generally, while analyzing Ethiopian financial regulatory requirements in light of GATS, 
conditions like minimum capital requirements are compatible as long as they are applied 
objectively and reasonably. However, requirements like nationality-based discrimination 
are contradictory. Therefore Ethiopia might have to revise those laws and practices before 
joining the WTO or should get accession commitments that maintain those requirements. 
(See detail discussion under section 3.2 and 3.3).  
2.4 Current Degree of Openness of the Ethiopian Financial Service Sector   
Following decades of tight economic centralization, Ethiopia has been undertaking unilate-
ral policy measures since 1992 through structural adjustment programs and poverty reduc-
tion strategic papers. Measures like privatization, substantial reduction of tariff and non-
tariff barriers, reduction and gradual elimination of all controls on domestic prices, deregu-
lation and realignment of foreign exchange rates and liberalization of investment policies 
are the results of the aforementioned reform programs. Some of these commitments were 
beyond what other LDCs as members of the WTO have accepted. However, these reforms 
were not multilaterally negotiated to give reciprocal concessions for Ethiopia.71  
The financial service sector was part of the above reform programs and it had focused on 
privatization. However, the opening of the sector for foreigners was not achieved despite 
huge pressure from the United States.72 Ethiopian Investment proclamation identifies four 
major modes of investment in Ethiopia: a) areas exclusively reserved for the government; 
b) areas exclusively reserved for Domestic investors73; c) areas permitted to foreign inves-
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tors74; and d) areas that are owned jointly by public and private or by foreign and domestic 
investors.75 Financial services are under Category b.  
Similarly Ethiopian financial laws76 provide that foreign nationals or organizations fully or 
partially owned by foreign nationals are not allowed to own FIs. Article 12(1) of the ban-
king business proclamation and Article 11(1) of the insurance business proclamation also 
puts a cap on the acquisition of share saying no person, other than the Federal GOE, may 
hold more than 5% of the total shares, either alone or jointly with relatives of the first de-
gree. 
Furthermore, Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors 
Council of Ministers Regulation No. 270/2012, under Article 3(1)(a), 3(2) and 4, provides 
that FIs are exclusively reserved for Ethiopian Nationals. Similarly Article 2(15) of the 
same legislation defines “Company” to mean a share company in which the whole shares 
are owned by Ethiopian nationals and registered under Ethiopian laws having its head of-
fice in Ethiopia.  
Generally Ethiopian legal regime regarding FIs regulation puts nationality, form and in-
vestment limitations. Foreigners cannot own FIs in Ethiopia. The maximum amount of in-
vestment (shares) to be held by a single investor in each FI is also limited. Besides, there is 
a prohibition on investors with substantial investment in one FI (influential shareholders) 
from investing in any other FI. FIs should also be share companies. Moreover, there are 
minimum capital requirements under each FI.77 In other words, Ethiopian law has delinea-
ted the scope of FIs activities and limited the scope of equity participation of FIs in other 
firms.78 On the other hand, there is no limit on the number of FIs that have to be licensed or 
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on the size they should have.79 There is no limitation on the number of service suppliers 
and limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service 
output. Likewise, there is no ceiling on capital entry.  
Finally, the degree of Ethiopian Financial service sector’s openness varies based on the 
mode of supply. It is closed from commercial presence of foreign FIs in Ethiopia (Mode 3). 
Cross-border supply of financial services (Mode 1) is permitted for selected services and 
institutions in insurance and banking sectors. Cross-border purchase of financial services is 
not explicitly regulated. There is no prohibition of consumption-abroad of financial services 
(Mode 2) as long as foreign exchange requirements are met. The same is true for Mode 2 
export of financial services. Finally, with regard to the presence of natural persons in 
Ethiopia to supply financial services (Mode 4), the NBE allows certain kinds of service 
providers to deliver their service in Ethiopia.80 (See section 2.3.1). 
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3 The Impact of Ethiopian Accession on the Financial Service 
sector  
In this chapter the key aspects of GATS for Ethiopian accession and the potential impact of 
Ethiopian accession on the financial service sector will be dealt with. In doing so, the four 
modes of financial service supply, the different scenarios under each mode and the poten-
tial impacts of the accession commitments on each scenarios will be discussed.  
3.1 Modes of supplying financial services 
International trade in financial services can occur in different modes and GATS Article I 
(2) distinguishes four of them. These modes are essentially defined on the basis of the ori-
gin of the service supplier and consumer, and the degree and type of territorial presence 
they have at the time of service delivery.81  
First, consumers can buy financial services through "long-distance" purchase while physi-
cally remaining in their home country known as "cross-border supply" or Mode 1. Today, 
technological advancement mainly in information and telecommunication has greatly faci-
litated cross-border supply of financial services, with Internet-banking or online purchase 
of insurance policies being common distribution channels.82 The supply of a service 
through telecommunication or mail is an example of cross-border supply since the service 
supplier is not present within the territory of the member where the service is delivered or 
consumed. International money transfer using foreign banks is common in Ethiopia despite 
limited use of cross-border supply of financial services due to legal, technological and 
communication barriers.  
Alternatively, consumers can travel to and buy financial services in the country where the 
financial services provider is located called "consumption abroad " or Mode 2. This mode 
of supply requires the movement of the consumer. The essential feature of this mode is that 
the service is delivered outside the territory of the member making the commitment. In this 
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regard, because of trade, education, work, tourism etc., many Ethiopians travel abroad and 
hence the use of financial services under this mode is inevitable. The use of financial ser-
vices delivered by Nordea Bank by Ethiopian students pursuing their studies in Norway can 
be a good example. 
The third mode of supply is the establishment of subsidiaries or branches in the destination 
market known as "commercial presence" or Mode 3. This can also occur through the estab-
lishment of new FIs known as "greenfield investment" or purchase of or investment in exis-
ting FIs. In Ethiopia, the latter is done in the context of privatization programs (since 
1992). This mode of supply in general covers the majority of global financial services 
supply in terms of sales (turnover), output, employment, value added, and number of enter-
prises involved.83 Commercial presence covers not only the presence of juridical persons in 
the strict legal sense, but also legal entities, which share some of the same characteristics. 
Commercial presence thus includes, inter alia, corporations, joint ventures, partnerships, 
subsidiaries and branches.84 In Ethiopia, as discussed under section 2.2, most of the finan-
cial service supply is conducted using this mode but only by domestic FIs.  
Finally, trade in financial services can occur in the form of individual persons travelling to 
the destination country and selling financial services, which is known as "presence of natu-
ral persons" or Mode 4. This mode covers natural persons who themselves are service sup-
pliers. In financial services, Mode 4 is mostly a consequence of commercial presence of 
FIs.85 Service provided by loss assessors, loss adjustors, actuaries or international auditors 
are some examples in Ethiopia. 
3.2 Key aspects of GATS for Ethiopian accession  
GATS consist of the framework agreement, its annexes, schedules of specific commitments 
and list of exemptions from MFN treatment by members. Specific commitments are either 
horizontal or sector-specific undertakings to provide market access and national treatment 
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on the terms and conditions specified in the schedule. Accordingly, while analyzing the 
relations between GATS and Ethiopia the following issues are crucial.  
3.2.1 Pro-LDC Objectives   
One of the major objectives of GATS as underlined under its preamble is to increase LDCs 
participation in trade in services by considering their interests and asking flexible applica-
tion of WTO rules.  
The General Council’s decision86 on how to handle LDCs’ accession provides that WTO 
members should exercise restraint in seeking concessions and commitments on trade in 
services. Moreover, acceding LDCs shall offer market access through reasonable conces-
sions and commitments and that should commensurate with their individual development, 
financial and trade needs. Similarly Article IV (3) of the GATS expects special priority to 
be given to LDCs in the implementation of negotiated specific commitments while Article 
XIX requires progressive liberalization from LDCs on the negotiation of specific commit-
ments by opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, and progressively 
extending market access. LDCs can also attach conditions while opening their markets. 
Nevertheless, WTO’s practical experience has been questioned repeatedly as acceding 
LDCs took more commitments while making fewer limitations.87 This trend is increasing 
through time and Ethiopian accession might be no exception.88  
3.2.2 Market Access  
WTO members cannot take restrictive measures like quota, requirements of form and max-
imum foreign-shareholding other than what is listed in their schedule under the GATS. Any 
such measures that violate the market-access obligation must be clearly inscribed. That is, 
when states join the WTO they have agreed to give market access and once that commit-
ment is registered in their schedule, they cannot retrieve and take restrictive actions.89  
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Article XVI of GATS provides that each member shall accord services and service sup-
pliers of any other member treatment no less favorable than what is provided under the 
terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its schedule. Such limitations even 
if they are not discriminatory are prohibited.90 
Ethiopia like many LDCs has set various types of limitations (see section 2.3.1 and 2.3.3) 
on market access on different modes of financial supply and in particular on access through 
commercial presence. These limitations revolve around ownership rules for foreign compa-
nies, the type of legal entity that a FI is allowed to operate, the amount of shares allowed 
for shareholders in FIs, the value of transactions or assets etc.91 Ethiopian accession nego-
tiation will, therefore, focus on adjusting or recognizing these limitations.  
3.2.3 National Treatment  
Based on Article XVII of GATS, for all sectors inscribed in members’ schedule and subject 
to any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each member shall accord to services 
and service suppliers of any other member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply 
of services, treatment no less favorable than what it accords to its own like services or ser-
vice suppliers. This tries to avoid all formally identical or different discriminatory treat-
ments and measures that may modify the conditions of competition to the detriment of for-
eign services or service suppliers.92  
In other words, under the service sub-sectors listed in a member's schedule of commit-
ments, a member may not take discriminatory measures against foreign services and ser-
vice suppliers. Foreign FIs and their services must be treated as favorably as domestic 
ones.93 Any measures that violate the national treatment obligation must be clearly listed in 
members’ schedule.  
For LDCs who joined the WTO with infant domestic FIs, restrictions on national treatment 
are strong on mode 3. These restrictions revolve around registration, authorization, per-
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formance, taxation, subsidization and technology-transfer requirements; licensing standards 
and qualifications; and nationality and residency requirements.94 Ethiopia has, so far, de-
nied market access to foreign FIs and hence measures affecting the supply of financial ser-
vices are only applicable to domestic FIs.  
3.2.4 MFN  
Based on GATS (Article II) each member must accord immediately and unconditionally to 
services and service suppliers of any other member treatment no less favorable than what it 
accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country. This requires members 
to treat all WTO members at equal terms in trade in services. WTO members may not 
discriminate among foreign-service providers by offering more favorable treatment to ser-
vice providers of one country. The best access conditions that a country has conceded to 
one state must automatically be extended to all other members.95 Members are permitted to 
maintain existing measures that contravene MFN obligations by listing on their MFN 
exemption list.96  
In Ethiopia, there is no distinction among the services and service suppliers from various 
countries. However, there are exemptions for trade agreements for which Ethiopia is a 
member including IGAD and COMESA.97 Looking at the financial service sector, foreign 
FIs are prohibited to operate in Ethiopia and hence it is impossible to analyze the applicabi-
lity of MFN’s principle. However, if Ethiopia joins the WTO, with the same rules in the 
service sector and by opening the financial sector, there will be no discrepancy. 
3.2.5 Transparency  
GATS Article III requires members to publish promptly all relevant measures of general 
application that may affect its operation except in the case of emergency. This obliges 
members to disclose any regulatory or institutional frameworks and changes that affect 
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trade in services as “foreign service” suppliers can face significant difficulties in operating 
in a country where domestic regulatory rules and regulations are vague.98  
In this regard, Ethiopia publishes its laws in its official journal, the Negarit Gazeta, sends 
sectoral regulations including financial market regulations to the regulated institutions and 
makes all laws and directives publicly available. It has also established a trade enquiry 
point from which information about laws and regulations can be accessed.99 Regarding the 
publication of measures of a general application in Ethiopia, there is no specific legislation. 
NBE in particular, has no such obligation except to disclose the information it collected 
from the FIs in exceptional cases.100  
3.2.6 Domestic regulation  
Another critical issue for discussion in the GATS is Article VI. In sectors where special 
commitments are undertaken, each member shall ensure that all measures of general appli-
cation affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial 
manner. For instance, qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and 
licensing requirements should not constitute barriers to trade; be based on objective and 
transparent criteria; and not be more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the 
service. Shortly, GATS recognizes prudential carve-out for investor, consumer and public 
interest protection; financial system integrity and stability; and monetary and national de-
velopment policy reasons. However, such regulatory measures shall not be designed and 
used to avoid member’s commitments. 
3.2.7 Payment and transfers  
Except in the case of restrictions to safeguard the balance of payment and external financial 
difficulties, members shall not restrict international transfers and payment for current 
transactions related to its specific commitments. The restrictions should be non-
                                                
 
98 Cattaneo(2010) p.10 
99 Stern(2007) p.99 
100 NBE establishment (amendment) Proclamation art 22 i.e. Exceptional cases include providing information 
to the Prime Minster, orders of a court and other legally authorized recipients.  
 30 
discriminatory, consistent with the IMF rules, and temporary.101 Such restrictions should 
also avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial, economic and financial interests of ot-
her members, should not exceed what is necessary to address the problem, and should not 
be used to protect specific industries or sectors.102  
Ethiopia, without liberalizing the capital account regime, allows international capital trans-
fers and payments on current transactions, international remittance and repatriation of 
funds in respect of foreign investments.103 Besides, the foreign exchange regime has been 
liberalized to allow domestic banks to retain and manage international foreign exchange 
positions in respect of imports and exports.  
3.3 Reckoning potential liberalization commitments and their impact 
3.3.1 Mode 1 Cross-border supply of financial services to Ethiopia 
In mode 1 the number of alternatives to liberalize financial services trade are limited. These 
are the status quo; conditional liberalization and the removal of all restrictions of cross-
border supply of financial services.  
3.3.1.1 Scenario I Status quo   
This scenario carries the possibility of rejecting the cross border supply of financial ser-
vices in Ethiopia from a financial service supplier located abroad. As discussed under sec-
tion 2.3.1, Ethiopian laws in principle do not allow cross boarder supply of financial ser-
vices except in few cases. The  realization of this scenario will then require changes in the 
existing legislations to allow cross-border financial service.  
However, this scenario will face two main challenges. One, Ethiopian banking and insu-
rance institutions need the help of foreign FIs under re-insurance to cover large and long 
term risks. For instance, this is true despite the recent introduction of re-insurance business 
by local insurance companies. Therefore, without developing the capacity and infrastructu-
re of FIs locally it is difficult to deny the cross boarder supply of financial services.  
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Two, today where digital information and technology connected the world, there is a de-
mand for quality and efficient financial services through cross-border supply to which 
Ethiopian financial service sector is no exception.  
To see the economic impacts of this scenario, exposure to foreign exchange risks and spill-
lover effects of foreign capital market developments and technology transfer are vital con-
siderations. Regarding the former, it should be noted that cross-border trade in financial 
services is a mode of supply that is most dependent on international capital transfers. Simi-
larly for GATS accession offers and negotiations, cross-border movement of capital and 
foreign currency is an essential part of the service itself, that members are thereby commit-
ted to allow such movement of capital.104 Liberalization of this mode is therefore difficult 
unless accompanied by commensurate liberalization of the capital account.  
As both past and current financial crises have shown, cross-border supply of financial ser-
vices exposes a country to a spillover effects from external crises. Ex ante, the likelihood of 
realizing costs or losses from cross-border trade are difficult to assess.105 Under risk adver-
se considerations and keeping in mind that a healthy financial sector is a vital ingredient for 
the functioning of the economy at large, a cautious approach in opening this mode is ad-
visable.106Smaller economies like Ethiopia are more vulnerable to capital movements that 
result in financial volatility and destabilization of domestic bank credit.107In particular, 
Ethiopia, with major drawback in the supply side of services, a huge gap between imports 
and exports and chronic shortage of foreign currency, cannot afford to undertake capital 
account liberalization. Therefore, maintaining capital controls (staying unbound) is the best 
option for Ethiopia.108 
Technology transfer from cross-border supply of financial services is very limited. This is 
because as the service provider remains in its home country and both consumers and do-
mestic FIs are unable to gain access to improved skill, technology and working mecha-
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nisms. Cross-border trade in financial services thus has very limited positive spillover ef-
fects for the development of Ethiopian financial service sector and economy.109 
Countries with stable financial systems and sound macroeconomic and regulatory 
framework have every reason to apply broad liberalization strategy and commit to far-
reaching commitments in this mode. However, in countries with weak financial systems, 
potentially volatile capital flows can be highly destabilizing, resulting in banking and cur-
rency crises.110 For instance, foreign banks might serve as conduits for inward and outward 
financial flow and might take “cut and run” policy whenever they felt a financial crisis is 
about to emerge.111 They might also shift funds abruptly from one market to another if they 
perceive changes in risk-adjusted returns. This will lead into full-blown economic crises 
and political instability.112Therefore, at least until the necessary domestic regulatory 
capacity and sound economic settings are created, it seems preferable for Ethiopia to keep 
this mode closed.113  
In sum, the liberalization of cross-border trade in financial services carries more risks and 
fewer benefits. Given the limited importance of cross-border trade in financial services in 
Ethiopia today, the impact of these risks may be small in quantitative terms.114This mode, 
which is highly dependent on international capital transfers, is the most sensitive mode and 
from the experiences of recently acceded states, it is possible for Ethiopia to maintain the 
status quo.115  
3.3.1.2 Scenario II Conditional liberalization  
Conditional liberalization of mode 1 is the opening of cross-border supply of financial ser-
vices with limitations like phasing out of barriers over a transition period; or restricting the 
type of sectors, the amount of capital or the group of persons or institutions allowed to 
engage in this mode; or allowing the use of cross-border supply of financial services only 
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in explicitly listed exceptional cases. This scenario is practically advantageous as it enables 
Ethiopia to continue filling the gap of domestic FIs service supply capacity while mi-
nimizing associated risks with cross-border supply. Shortly, this scenario balances the ne-
gative and positive sides of liberalization in this mode while giving regulatory space for 
Ethiopia. It will be useful even if foreign FIs are introduced in other modes. On the other 
hand, this scenario requires amendments on the current regulatory laws of Ethiopia so as to 
explicitly mention the cases where cross-border supply of financial services will be al-
lowed. On the other hand, the cases where mode 1 will be open can be mentioned in 
Ethiopian schedule of commitments. 
3.3.1.3 Scenario III – Cross border trade in financial services will be fully liberalized 
The other option for Ethiopia in mode 1 is to fully open the cross border supply of financial 
services. It is beyond the status quo and partial liberalization of the sector as not only 
Ethiopian FIs, public enterprises and sub-sectors form abroad but also consumers will have 
direct access to financial services from abroad. This scenario will require deeper changes in 
the financial regulatory laws of Ethiopia in order to remove existing prohibitions.   
Cross-border trade in financial services entails opportunities to engage in advanced, mo-
dern and efficient financial activities from the international market which will allow a 
higher margin than the Ethiopian market despite only for a very few portion of consumers 
who are able and aware of consuming financial services under this scenario. Besides, the 
opening up of this mode will increase the type of financial products and the capital base of 
the sector.  
However, with limited digital and technological capacity, infant domestic FIs and poor 
regulatory capacity of the NBE, the possibility of facing one-way traffic of financial ser-
vices supply under this scenario is high. This is because of Ethiopian domestic inability to 
make cross-border supply of financial services to the financial service customers located 
abroad and due to pre-existing cross border financial service supply capacity and expe-
rience from foreign financial service suppliers to customers located in Ethiopia, the market 
access advantage that may be achieved with this scenario is negligible. Besides, Ethiopian 
FIs, with poor telecom and technological infrastructure, has little to offer while there will 
be a huge supply of financial services from foreign FIs following such liberalizations. 
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Hence, from a market access point of view, this scenario offers very little for Ethiopian FIs 
unless it is used as a leverage to hold-on commitments in other modes.   
On the other hand the permission of mode 1 in the financial service sector will not contri-
bute much in improving competition, reducing the concentration of FIs in urban areas or 
improving the accessibility of FIs in rural areas, and multiplying financial products. This is 
because the potential consumers of financial products in this scenario are very few located 
in urban areas for infrastructural and technological reasons. Rather, liberalization in this 
regard, will force domestic FIs to stick to rural areas, poor consumers and traditional finan-
cial services, as large-scale, urban and elite consumers will be covered by cross-border 
supply from foreign FIs. However, Ethiopian major problem in the financial service sector 
i.e. inaccessibility of financial services will remain unsolved.  
The issue of confidence between the supplier and consumer in this scenario will be another 
reason to make this scenario practically difficult. For instance to seek loan or to purchase 
insurance policy from a FI located abroad, the necessary check up procedures, guaranty 
mechanisms and institutional structures will be far and limited in Ethiopia. However, by 
their very nature financial services require high level of trust between the supply and de-
mand sides.116 Therefore, lack of confidence of FIs on Ethiopian consumers and vice versa 
will be an obstacle from getting the limited benefits of this scenario.  
To conclude, it is understandable for the GOE to seek to maintain the status quo due to big 
risks involved in cross-border supply of financial services. However, considering its FIs’ 
gap and dependency on foreign FIs, conditional liberalization that balances the prospects 
and risks of this mode is the best option for Ethiopia. Similarly, for WTO members, where 
there are few potential consumers, infrastructural and technological barriers in Ethiopia, 
and questions of trust and confidence between their FIs and Ethiopian consumers, mode 1 
is not the most ideal one either. Therefore, conditional liberalization seems feasible for both 
WTO members and Ethiopia.  
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3.3.2 Mode 2 Consumption of financial services by Ethiopians abroad 
Consumption abroad of financial services i.e. Ethiopians opening bank account or purcha-
sing insurance policy while being abroad is very difficult to regulate. The whole transaction 
takes places outside of Ethiopia following the cross boarder movement of the consumer 
unlike the cross border supply of the financial services themselves. However, it involves 
transnational capital flows with the consumer and that requires indirect monitoring.117  
The importance of mode 2 trade in financial services, and hence its potential impact on the 
Ethiopian financial services sector or on the economy in general, is limited.118 The only 
thing that may be at stake as far as Ethiopian FIs and regulators are concerned in this mode 
is the fulfillment of monetary and foreign exchange requirements while going abroad or 
returning to Ethiopia. That is; as far as Ethiopian consumers fulfill the necessary condi-
tions, like declaring foreign currency, the Ethiopian financial service sector will not face 
any difficulty. However, given the high level of corruption (see section 3.4.2), opening this 
mode should be considered with the goal of reducing the flow of public money out of the 
country without proper regulation.  
Moreover, the opening up of this mode will only require few legislative changes as 
Ethiopia currently does not prohibit Ethiopians from going abroad and consuming financial 
services other than obliging the disclosure of foreign currency at the time of entry and exit 
(see section 2.3.1).  
However, liberalization in this mode together with the result of liberalization in other mo-
des might motivate Ethiopian domestic FIs to increase their capacity and efficiency in the 
long run to reach Ethiopian consumers located abroad without additional burden. This can 
be seen from two angles. One, if Ethiopia is to commit full liberalization in mode 2, there 
will be no additional duty or negative consequence beyond the current reality. Two, fol-
lowing such liberalization, foreign FIs will be officially recognized and continue to serve 
Ethiopian consumers located outside of Ethiopia (in their territory or beyond). This, howe-
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ver, is a matter of fact regardless of the opening up of this mode and it is not up to Ethiopia 
to do otherwise.  
Ethiopia, therefore, is less likely to bear pressure to commit in this mode. Considering the 
difficulty of regulating the consumption of financial services abroad, this mode also seems 
easy for GOE to accept.119 The experience of recently acceded countries with the exception 
of Nepal also shows that this mode has been fully liberalized in all cases. Therefore, offe-
ring full liberalization of this mode, which bears no cost, is a harmless decision for 
Ethiopia.120  
3.3.3 Mode 3 Commercial presence of foreign FIs in Ethiopia 
For the physical entry of foreign financial service providers into the Ethiopian market, dif-
ferent scenarios can be identified. This varies from the preservation of the existing regime 
to allowing full foreign ownership of FIs in Ethiopia. In between, foreign partial or joint 
ownership of FIs through equity participation, ‘‘greenfield investment’’, branches and sub-
sidiaries are other possibilities.121 The first two scenarios represent the highest possible 
demand by the GOE to retain the sector closed for foreign FIs and the demand of WTO 
members for full liberalization of the sector. The rest scenarios represent partial joint ven-
ture ownership of existing FIs, establishing new FIs or both by foreigners.122  
From experience most DCs have allowed this mode of supply with different restrictions on 
the extent of foreign participation. Besides, national treatment limitations in this mode are 
wider compared to limitations on market access.123 Currently, Ethiopia has one of the few 
overtly protected financial markets in the world prohibiting the commercial presence of 
foreigners in the financial sector (see section 2.3.1). Thus, this will be the most important 
subject of negotiations in Ethiopian accession bid and possibly the entire accession negotia-
tions can become contingent upon its outcome.124  
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3.3.3.1 Scenario I – Maintaining the status quo  
This section deals with a scenario in which the commercial presence of foreign financial 
service providers is totally prohibited. As has been discussed earlier in section 2.3.1, mar-
ket access under the current regime excludes the presence of foreign FIs in Ethiopia and 
forces consumers to use domestic FIs and the GOE might try to retain this position. Howe-
ver, reserving financial services to Ethiopian nationals, which will not require legal and 
regulatory changes, is likely to face strong challenge and rejection from WTO members. 
Thus, potentially, there exists a very small chance that Ethiopia will be able to join the 
WTO without being committed to anything in this particular mode.  
The main beneficiaries of the status quo are domestic infant FIs, whereas the overall effect 
on the economy is likely to be less positive, with the exception of availability of rural ban-
king and micro-finance services.125 However, even from domestic infant FIs point of view, 
public and private FIs (particularly banks) will have different reaction with a varying de-
gree. This is because (as indicated earlier in section 2.2.1) private banks are under unne-
cessary and tight regulation of the NBE whereas public banks remain dominant and bene-
ficiaries of such hindrance of private banks. Consequently, facing the tough but free com-
petition from strong and experienced FIs from abroad is a lesser evil for domestic private 
FIs who are yet to wine the dominance of public FIs. They can use their experience and 
nexus with domestic consumers to wine such competition once the restrictive environment 
is adjusted. In the past two decades, even with the difficult working environment, Ethiopian 
private FIs stayed profitable and successful. However, much would have been achieved, 
had it not been for the inefficient financial regulation and week business environment in the 
system.  
In other words, what the status quo holds for domestic FIs is a restrictive regime, con-
siderable concentration and competition between ‘unequals’ as far as they and state-owned 
FIs are concerned. This is because public FIs are relatively well established, with large 
network of branches, high capital and reserve base. These facts contribute towards reducing 
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costs of public FIs and enhance their capacity. In addition, there exists no competition 
among the state owned FIs who are working in a cooperative manner.126  
Moreover, maintaining the status quo will have different impact on stakeholders in each 
financial sub-sector. It is good news for domestic public FIs as they can continue their do-
minance and the NBE as there will be no additional task of regulation. If the dominant po-
sition of the CBE is unchallenged, the current cross-subsidizing mechanism for rural bran-
ches to ensure rural finance in the banking business can continue.127 The same will be true 
for Ethiopian MFIs and their consumers. However, private domestic FIs as discussed above 
will have mixed feelings; the continuation of restrictive regulatory system and uncompeti-
tive financial environment is a bad news while the protection against the competition from 
strong and experienced foreign FIs with huge capital and reputation is a good news al-
lowing them to develop at their own pace.  
From Ethiopian consumers’ point of view, the following can be said. After liberalizing the 
sector for private domestic FIs since 1992, competition is still limited and the market conti-
nues to be dominated by public FIs with poor quality and limited efficiency. The increase 
in the number of FIs or branches has not led to increased competition and there is indeed 
little prospect that the establishment of further domestic private FIs would significantly 
change this situation without the introduction of international state-of-the-art and technolo-
gy, and without changing the way how the sector is regulated.128  
Particularly in the banking sector, access to finance heavily depends on the availability of 
collateral restricting the availability of loan finance in the Ethiopian economy. There is also 
a financing gap for long-term credits, retail lending and housing & construction loans. The 
poor coverage of banking services, especially in rural areas and the portfolio of banking 
products in Ethiopia has remained limited and without the transfer of international capital 
and know-how, it would remain the same.  
                                                
 
126 Lelissa(2007) p.58 
127 Stern(2007) p.126 
128 Ibid 
 39 
Similarly in the insurance sector, domestic insurance companies will be shielded from for-
eign competition and can continue to develop at their own pace. However, there is no de-
velopmental benefit that is comparable to the CBE's role in securing rural finance and the 
national payment system. Besides, private insurance companies hold more capital and 
customers than the public insurance companies. Therefore, maintaining the status quo will 
have no larger public interest arguments in the insurance sector.  
Moreover, despite the existence of high competition in the insurance market the product 
range has remained limited, and large and long-term risks coverage is rare. Insurance poli-
cies for life, engineering and agricultural risks are particularly lacking. Without an interna-
tional impetus and know how this situation is unlikely to change. Outdated risk assessment 
and premium setting methods, and vague pricing methods will remain unimproved.129 
In Ethiopia, with large rural population, there is no shortage of viable business opportuni-
ties like in agriculture and small businesses. However, much of the financial system’s asset 
is invested in government securities, and not enough is lent to privately held companies to 
grow their businesses and create jobs. This is due to NBE’s requirement and the fact that 
lending to the private sector, especially small and medium-sized businesses, is risky, costly, 
and requires collateral that borrowers do not have.130 Therefore, these problems will conti-
nue with the status quo. 
Another way to analyze the entry of foreign FIs in Ethiopia compared to the status quo is 
the experience of the last twenty years. Ethiopian financial performance has improved since 
the introduction of private FIs regardless of the huge capital and opportunity possessed by 
public FIs, and this shows the strength of private FIs. For public banks interest-rate spread 
is smaller, cost is higher and the return of asset is lower than private banks.131 This shows 
the fast grwoth rate of private banks which results in better service quality and quantity. 
Therefore, by the same analogy, if foreign FIs are allowed to enter Ethiopian financial 
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market at least without excluding the public dominant FIs for their public interest objecti-
ves, the competition and perceived advantages will be better.132  
Generally, mintaining status quo will bring nothing different for the Ethiopian financial 
sector than the poor reality available today and all the prevailing problems will continue. 
Besides, this scenario is hardly achievable. Even the GOE admits the existence of many 
problems in the current financial topography and it should, therefore, make elegant liberali-
zation of mode 3 (anything other than the status quo) as part of a long-term solution.  
Alternatively, the GOE might seek gradual and progressive liberalization with particular 
duration for maintaining the status quo upon which it will build domestic financial service 
capacity. Such opening requires a number of measures from the government and financial 
sector stakeholders including strengthening domestic FIs for increased competition on two 
levels. At the systemic level, the financial sector infrastructure needs to be improved like 
the telecom, electricity and information communication. This must go hand in hand with 
the second level where it builds the capacity of individual domestic financial services prov-
iders. Perhaps, even more important is the upgrading of the regulatory framework and su-
pervision capacities.133  
3.3.3.2 Scenario II – Allow foreign partial ownership of FIs as equity participation in 
existing FIs 
Foreign financial service providers entry through partial equity participation will offer flex-
ible alternatives and require a significant amendment of existing laws that govern FIs in 
Ethiopia.  
This scenario will increase the capital, skill and technology base of domestic FIs without 
competing them out of business. An increased capital base will increase the availability of 
loan finance to the economy in general while the skill and technology transfer will advance 
the quality and efficiency of the financial service system of the state.134 Coupled with better 
credit allocation mechanisms and procedures, the aforementioned qualities will contribute 
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to enhance Ethiopian economic growth. With their better methodologies to assess risk and 
creditworthiness of customers, the entry of foreign FIs will improve competition, the mix 
of financial services, innovation, productivity, and risk management tools, thereby contri-
buting to the overall soundness of the financial system.135 The benefits would be even grea-
ter if foreign banks enter retail banking and lease financing in addition to corporate banking 
as that would fill a large financing gap in the country without having a major impact on 
domestic banks that are not currently operating in this market segment. 
However, this scenarios’ implications for agricultural credit and the availability of banking 
services in rural areas will depend on how the market shares will be affected in the most 
profitable market segments. These are in particular, the institutions that are providing rural 
banking services. Currently, MFIs, the CBE and DBE are the main formal sources of fi-
nance in rural areas eventhough their services remain limited. The CBE in particular holds 
the largest banking capital and maintains a large network of branches nationwide, making it 
the key institution in the payments system of the country. It is able to do so primarily by 
subsidizing its non-profitable branches out of its profits on its operations in major urban 
areas. Therefore, contribution in this regard depend on how small-scale consumers and 
profit margins are attractive enough for the enterant FIs or if those FIs are open for equity 
participation. Basically, foreign FIs will not focus on poverty alleviation issues and access 
of low-income and rural-based consumers other than profit making objective.136 
So far with the expansion of domestic private banks, the CBE is losing market and profit 
share in urban areas, where banks currently make most of their business. Consequently, 
following liberalization in this mode, the competition will be between the private banks 
with foreign equity participation and the CBE (assuming it remains fully state-owned). 
Thus, such a loss of market share and subsequent erosion of its capacity to subsidize will 
result in the reduction of its accessibility for rural consumers and declining ability to main-
tain its nationwide banking services.137 
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Another possibility under this scenario is where the CBE allows the participation of foreign 
banks in its equity. This will strengthen its capital and efficiency without losing its domi-
nant position and its objective of reaching for rural customers. It will not be weakened by 
increased competition from new foreign entrants while foreign banks are likely to see its 
extensive branch network as an asset.138  
Another option to preserve rural banking services while liberalizing this mode would be to 
establish specialized rural FIs like cooperatives and community banking or charge the DBE 
or MFIs with more responsibility and capital that would takeover rural lending activities 
from the CBE (similar to the experience of Indonesia and Kenya).139 Consequently, CBE 
can be liberalized or relieved from making rural lending depend on its cross-subsidization 
from urban operations. Such schemes can be inserted as reservation under Ethiopian acces-
sion commitments.  
The impact of this scenario on domestic savings mobilization depends on the degree to 
which foreign FI with equity participation rely on foreign funds (from their parent compa-
nies or borrowed abroad) to finance their lending operations and that will have an implica-
tion on the short-term capital flow component of Ethiopian capital account.140 This is 
because external private finance is an unreliable source for domestic capital formation and 
access to foreign loanable funds exposes a country to foreign cycles due to shocks arising 
from external economic and financial developments affecting the domestic lending and 
deposit base.141  
Nevertheless, foreign banks are unlikely to use foreign funds to finance domestic lending in 
Ethiopia because of the risks involved with foreign exchange. Likewise, the outflow of 
local savings out of the country is minimal. This will force banks with foreign equity to 
engage in domestic savings and collection of deposits by opening branches to finance their 
activities. Similarly, consumers will have more confidence in banks with foreign equity as 
they are expected to be well established at least better than domestic banks without foreign-
                                                
 
138 Bezabeh(2014) p.34 
139 Staschen(2013) P.72 
140 Claessens(2013) p.15 
141 Dobson(2008) p.297 
 43 
equity participation. The only line of business that foreign banks would likely finance in 
foreign currencies is trade and that goes in line with the existing rules regarding the prohi-
bition of private sector borrowing from abroad and with the most feasible negotiation pos-
sibility of denying the capital account liberalization.142 Besides, changes in the foreign ex-
change regime are not required so that the risks associated with this scenario are minimi-
zed. However, additional measures may be needed to ensure new entrants, who rely less 
heavily on domestic deposits, have a positive effect on domestic savings mobilization.  
The main issue with regard to foreign equity participation is the maximum limit of such 
participation. That is, either to allow foreign majority share other than 100%- which will 
allow control of the company- or if it should be limited below majority. Another option is 
in line with the current financial regulation where the ownership by a single shareholder of 
FIs is limited to a maximum of 5% of shares (see section 2.3.3 and 2.4).143 There is an ob-
vious inverse relationship between the interest of foreign FIs to buy equity in domestic FIs 
and the ceiling on their participation.144  
Allowing foreign majority share will be attractive for foreign FIs but less likely to be ac-
cepted by the GOE because it will not be different from fully liberalizing and allowing 
complete control of domestic FIs by foreigners. If that happens, the above mentioned posi-
tive consequences (more competition and financial products, transfer of technology and 
know-how etc.) are likely to materialize while foreign FIs especially banks will be able to 
control the market and set prices after a while. That is because the chance of facing strong 
competition and resulting exclusion of domestic FIs from Ethiopian market is high. 
Foreign ownership limit below majority share is mutually beneficial and acceptable for 
both the GOE and WTO members. However, allowing foreign equity participation more 
than 5% means the current limitation on the ownership by a single shareholders has to be 
revised. On the other hand, allowing foreign ownership in line with the current Ethiopian 
legislations will not attract foreign FIs.  
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The other option is one that combines the above scenarios to allow foreign FIs’ entry 
through progressive amount of equity participation. In the above scenarios, domestic FIs 
would benefit to a certain extent from a substantial degree of protection and might prefer to 
remain infant and rent seeking, and lobby for the continuation of the ceilings on foreign 
equity participation. However, progressive increase of equity-participation can be a solu-
tion to that. Besides, domestic FIs especially banks may be sheltered behind foreign FIs’ 
equity rather than taking advantage of their opportunity and winning the competition by 
building their capacity. Therefore, making restrictions on this form of progressive entry and 
time-bound is a wise strategy that can serve as a transitional and motivational factor for 
domestic FIs.  
3.3.3.3 Scenario III - Establishment of new FIs with partial foreign ownership  
Under the entry of foreigners in to Ethiopian financial sector through “greenfield” invest-
ments, both domestic state-owned and private FIs would face competition from newly es-
tablished FIs that are not affiliated with foreign FIs. This scenario, which will require 
changes in the Ethiopian financial legislations from prohibiting foreign FIs to allowing 
their participation in such a way, will increase the number of FIs in the country and raise 
the capital base and competition level.  
Given their current state in terms of capital, human resource, technology etc., existing do-
mestic FIs would be exposed to stronger competition without benefiting from the transfer 
of know-how and technology in this scenario. This implies little advantage and huge risk of 
failure from infant industry argument point of view.145 Consequently, resistance from the 
incumbent domestic FIs who will not be part of the new joint venture will be expected. 
However, consumers of the new ‘‘greenfield’’ investment FIs will be beneficiaries as they 
will have more options, better quality and cheap price of financial services.   
This scenario will increase the number of FIs and this implies more competition. In 
Ethiopia, the number of FIs is still relatively small with very low FIs-to-population ratio 
(see table 1). However, the limited competition in the financial sector is not mainly a result 
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of shortage in the number of FIs but the existence of dominant players, lack of capacity to 
compete and lack of financial products.146 Consequently, the entry of new joint venture FIs 
and the increase in the number of FIs will not necessarily contribute to more competition. 
Equity participation in existing banks might be more desirable as it increases their capacity 
to compete with the dominant players than under this scenario.  
In this scenario, as FIs are not formed jointly with existing foreign FIs, it will not bring FIs 
with huge reputation, capital and experience from abroad. Thus, competition with the exis-
ting domestic FIs and technology transfer is limited compared to other scenarios. There-
fore, the chance of building and improving domestic infant FIs is minimal and hence, if 
Ethiopia is to liberalize commercial presence of foreign FIs, this will not be the best option.     
Looking at the relationship between this and the previous scenario, the initiative, freedom 
of foreigners and the impact on domestic FIs are the main differences. Both scenarios are 
joint ventures that need the participation of Ethiopians and foreigners. However ‘‘green-
field’’ investment allows foreigners to set up a new FI independently while the previous 
scenario allows them only to participate in already existing FIs. Accordingly, under the 
previous scenario domestic FIs have a say about the entry of foreign FIs by analyzing their 
performance and growth, and can decide if unity with foreign FIs or staying independent is 
beneficial for them. They can maximize their advantages and use the liberalization realties 
as an opportunity. This, however, is not the case under ‘‘greenfield’’ investment. Never-
theless, it is possible for foreigners to initiate Ethiopians to set up new FIs with whom they 
can form a joint venture. Therefore, to close such loopholes, allowing both scenarios simul-
taneously or limiting joint-venture foreign equity participation only with domestic FIs that 
exist before a certain period of time can be a solution.  
3.3.3.4 Scenario IV - Establishment of fully foreign owned branches of FIs 
Under this scenario, foreign FIs will be allowed to open branches with full ownership and 
without the need to independently incorporate in Ethiopia. This scenario is quite different 
from the status quo and will require the amendment of the existing regulatory laws.  
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Generally, the relation between branches and parent companies regarding consumers’ legal 
claim is complicated. On one hand, consumers of branch-offices can claim on the assets of 
FIs as a whole. Conversely, creditors of the parent FI can have claims on any of its branch. 
The same is true during insolvency. Therefore, the parent institution and its branch office 
cannot be separated and that may be both a security and risk.147 
Under this scenario, Ethiopian FIs can benefit from improved supervision and consumer 
protection experience of the entrant foreign FIs whose target is to stay profitable and main-
tain their reputation.148 In other words, by serving clients active in more than one country, 
the new entrant FIs can achieve benefits from spreading best-practice policies and procedu-
res. They are able to assess and diversify risk better and have more diversified funding 
sources.149 Moreover, the entry of foreign FIs in emerging markets allows the introduction 
of stronger and more prudent regulation by the host-state, and this increases the soundness 
of the local financial service sector.150 Similarly, this scenario will increase the competition 
deliver more financial products and broaden the capital base. Besides, from experience, 
branches of foreign FIs outperform domestic FIs and that is an advantage for consumers.151 
However, branches of foreign FIs will have cream skimming behavior, with limited num-
ber of branches, focusing on the most profitable financial activities and consumers in 
Ethiopia where private returns than social; lending than borrowing; or large scale operators 
than small-scale consumers will be preferred.152 For instance, in the banking sector, fol-
lowing such cherry-pick character, domestic borrowing or saving, rural and retail banking, 
long term and development related financial services might be ignored. Of course like 
“greenfield investments”, branches of foreign banks may be forced to open more branches 
and collect domestic saving to finance their activities. This is because doing it otherwise 
will have foreign exchange costs. It will also contradict with the capital account regulation 
of the state unless changes are made during the accession negotiations (see section 3.3.1).  
                                                
 
147 Ageba (2008) p.17 
148 Dobson(2008) p.296 
149 Bezabeh(2014) p.33 
150 Claessens(2012) p.3 
151 Id, p.1 
152 Bezabeh(2014) p.34 
 47 
The presumed efficiency of branches of foreign FIs, their range of products, ability to 
respond to customer needs, and the convenience of their global reach makes them attractive 
to exporters and importers in the new picture of competition while domestic FIs will 
remain with limited capacity and role. Besides, technology and skill share benefits for do-
mestic infant FIs is minimal in this scenario. Foreign FIs’ branches may therefore be in a 
good position to capture a significant part of the vital international trade finance and they 
will encourage the advancement of oligopolistic market structure.153 This in turn will force 
domestic FIs to adjust their operations to wine the competition and in the worst case to 
consolidate their operations through mergers or sell out. If this happens to public FIs, prio-
ritizing developmental needs of the state, serving neglected sections of the society and 
spreading the accessibility of financial services across the country will retard. Similarly, if 
private FIs are forced to sell-out, the competition will be limited between branches of for-
eign FIs and domestic public FIs to the disadvantage of consumers.  
On the other hand, even if it is tough for domestic FIs’ growth, competition under this sce-
nario will result in high quality service and cheap products for consumers at least in the 
short run. Comparing the reputation, experience and capital of branches of foreign FIs with 
the proximity of domestic FIs towards domestic consumers interest and existing regula-
tions, the market will ultimately be decided by the best pricing and service quality. 
Moreover, the lack of financial infrastructure like electricity, Internet and information 
availability in Ethiopia will restrain branches of foreign FIs while domestic FIs are familiar 
with such realities. The end product of such strong competition is beneficial for consumers 
as both camps will be forced to exploit their opportunities to the maximum.154 Lower bor-
rowing costs and smaller interest-rate margins are good examples.155 
Regarding the regulation of FIs, this scenario will bring an extra dimension of branch-
parent institutional relationship into the picture. Ethiopian regulators whose aim is to pro-
tect consumers will be concerned especially given the recent tendency of parent FIs to pre-
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vent themselves against liabilities emanating from their foreign branches by including the 
so-called “ring-fencing” provisions.156 However, it is possible to prohibit such kind of be-
havior by mentioning through Ethiopian market access commitments. As far as foreign FIs’ 
branches comply with the establishment, operation and closure rules of the host country, 
the chance of legal claims that goes beyond the asset of the branch offices is minimal. 
Simply, branches will be required to comply with domestic financial regulations as if they 
are incorporated under Ethiopian laws. One way of minimizing the risks of this scenario 
while maximizing the possible advantages is by allowing the opening of branches of for-
eign FIs in Ethiopia limited to reputable international FIs using international standards. For 
instance, allowing only international banks that comply with Basel standards or those that 
are rated high by international rating institutions (as in the case of Nepal) is one option.   
Another way of controlling the operation of branches of foreign FIs in line with the regula-
tory and economic demands of the host-state is by attaching conditions to their operation. 
This can include the requirement to engage in local currency denominated business, limita-
tion on foreign currency transactions, requirement to engage in some untouched financial 
activities and regions of the host state. However, this will have three drawbacks. One, 
WTO members are unlikely to accept such arrangements. Two, it will reduce the interest of 
foreign FIs from penetrating the Ethiopian market. Third, it will harm the market by limi-
ting the competition in attractive financial segments and consumers will not get the expec-
ted benefits.  
3.3.3.5 Scenario V - Establishment of subsidiaries of foreign FIs  
This scenario will introduce subsidiaries as separate entities from their parent FIs where 
creditors have no legal claims on the parent FI or any of its other subsidiaries.157 Therefore, 
the relationship between consumers and subsidiaries of foreign FIs in Ethiopia will be limi-
ted locally based on their asset and financial performance. The regulation will also be total-
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ly based on Ethiopian laws which will require changes from the current closed reality.158 
The effect of this scenario is similar to scenario IV. Reputation plays a big role in this sce-
nario despite the doubt to what extent big foreign FIs’ operation in Ethiopia through subsi-
diary will affect their name and image.159 As the operation of subsidiaries is independent 
and as the link between the parent institution from abroad and the subsidiary established in 
Ethiopia is far, this scenario is similar to that of “greenfield investment”. 
Welcoming subsidiaries has limited technology and skill transfer benefits as new entrant 
FIs’ operational link with their parent institution is limited. Besides credit allocation might 
be skewed from the point of view of the government. Other benefits of liberalization like 
broadening the capital base, advancing the quality and quantity of financial products will 
be subjected to the kind of subsidiaries that will arrive in Ethiopia. Therefore to maximize 
such advantages, like in the case of branches, Ethiopia can attach conditions up on which 
subsidiaries will be allowed to enter the Ethiopian market. However, this scenario will im-
prove the competition and financial activities in the country at least to a certain extent bet-
ter than the current reality and that will support the productivity of the sector and its impact 
on the economy. In other words, improved competition in this scenario will force FIs to 
search for new customers and financial products to the best interest of consumers.  
Regarding the impacts of this scenario on the regulatory practice and laws of Ethiopia, first, 
by bringing new players in the game, like the previous scenario, it will require changes in 
the existing regulatory laws. Second, the aforementioned facts add regulatory headaches for 
regulators especially given the limited capacity of the NBE. Therefore, compared to other 
scenarios, the liberalization of this scenario should not be Ethiopia’s top priority as it has 
little signifance for the country.  
3.3.3.6 Scenario VI - Establishment of new fully owned foreign FIs in Ethiopia  
This alternative allows the creation of new FIs or “greenfield investment” in Ethiopia 
(discussed under section 3.3.3.3) but with a full foreign ownership. Looking at its potential 
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impact, it is similar to scenario IV and V except that the new FIs in this scenario are inde-
pendent from foreign FI.  
This scenario will shake the current financial regulatory rules concerning the total prohibi-
tion of foreign ownership of FIs in the country. Generally, this scenario is equally bene-
ficial and risky that it should not be prioritized at least in the short run. It will be highly 
attractive for foreign investors where as domestic FIs will face strong competition without 
the possibility for technology transfer. Besides, with high macroeconomic volatility this 
scenario will demand advanced regulation, which is not currently available in the country.  
The current state of development of the financial sector in Ethiopia, where a large part of 
the population does not have access to FIs, is a positive factor that will attract foreign FIs in 
this scenario. It is, therefore, easier for foreign FIs to gain market share and therefore likely 
easier to be productive and make a higher profit. On the other hand, size is an important 
factor for the performance of FIs and if the new entrants under this scenario are big FIs, 
then domestic FIs are likely to lose the competition.160  
Increasing the capital base of the financial sector, catalyzing the competition and adding 
financial service quality and the portfolio of products are possible gains of this scenario for 
consumers. However, despite the high demand from WTO members for the liberalization 
of this scenario, the GOE will hardly accept such demands. This is because, considering the 
aforementioned risks, the state seems to be not ready for drastic changes in the financial 
system as the gap between the status quo and this scenario is huge.  
3.3.4 Mode 4 Presence of natural persons in Ethiopia to provide financial services 
In financial services, the presence of natural persons is usually a consequence of Mode 3 
issues with the exception of some independent auxiliary services like actuaries or financial 
sector consultants.161 The use of this mode and its impact on the Ethiopian economy is con-
sidered to be minimal. There will also be less pressure from the accession negotiations and 
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perhaps less concern from domestic economic considerations towards committing to this 
mode.  
Almost none of the recently acceded countries made commitments in this mode and thus, 
Ethiopia can, similarly, reinforce any strategy that keeps its economic and legal interest. 
However, liberalization in this mode requires the movement of people and labor asking 
good labor standards and that will require amendment of the laws of Ethiopia.162  
This mode can have three scenarios. These are fully allowing foreigners to supply financial 
services while they are in Ethiopia, denying natural persons to provide financial services 
while they are in Ethiopia, and allowing conditional liberalization. Ethiopian current finan-
cial laws and practices allow foreign expertise to provide technical services in exceptional 
cases and falls in the third scenario (see section 2.3.1). However, the presence of intra-
corporate transferees should also be allowed for a medium term in order for them to work 
in the joint venture and deliver financial services. Besides the temporary presence of these 
types of natural persons is recommendable to enable intra-corporate transfer of knowledge. 
The temporary stay of business visitors to prepare the establishment of a commercial pre-
sence of a financial service provider should also be open.163 Commitments regarding the 
temporary presence of contractual service suppliers should be considered in particular for 
auxiliary financial services. However, contractual service suppliers for basic financial ser-
vices are largely irrelevant. Besides, all the above can be limited with different time scales.  
Having the impact of LDCs’ accession to the WTO on the four modes of financial service 
supply as a lesson for Ethiopia, the following can be concluded. 
The most limited commitments have been made regarding cross-border supply while most 
countries scheduled far-reaching commitments in service supply through commercial pre-
sence.164 This could be explained by the importance of transnational capital flows and ac-
ceding states’ concern about currency crises. On the other hand, with the exception of Ne-
pal, Mode 2 has been fully liberalized by most countries across the board. Regarding the 
presence of natural persons to supply financial services, most states have not made specific 
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commitments. In the horizontal sections, generally, the presence of natural persons is left 
unbound with a number of exceptions for the temporary presence of certain categories of 
business visitors.165 Moreover, market access commitments are far more limited than natio-
nal treatment commitments. For instance, under mode 3 most countries have eliminated 
virtually all limitations on national treatment. 
Considering the practicability, economic advantage and risks associated in liberalizing the 
four modes of financial service supply for Ethiopia, the best combination of alternatives for 
all stakeholders would be; Conditional liberalization of cross border supply in explicit ca-
ses; fully opening mode 2; allowing the commercial presence of foreigners through bran-
ches, subsidy or equity participation; and conditional liberalization of the provision of fi-
nancial services by natural persons. Besides, conditions like progressive equity participa-
tion, shares not more than 49% or allowing only branches of highly ranked Foreign FIs can 
be attached.  
3.4 Cross-cutting issues  
As discussed above (under section 3.3) strategic negotiation and proper assessment of 
commitment scenarios are vital for Ethiopia to maximize the benefits of acceding to the 
WTO in general and for the advancement of the financial service sector in particular. 
However, accession to the WTO alone is not the only answer for existing problems in the 
financial service sector. It is equally important for the GOE to deal with the following is-
sues. These issues are crucial even if Ethiopia failed to join the WTO or whatever 
commitment scenarios it might achieve from its accession negotiations.  
3.4.1 Let the NBE focus on regulatory tasks 
According to the GATS Article I (3), services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority are not recognized as such. In the case of Ethiopia, the activities of central banks 
like carrying out monetary or exchange rate policies are excluded. However, this exclusion 
does not include services that are supplied either on a commercial basis or in competition 
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with service supplier(s). Therefore, the NBE’s regulatory and macroeconomic functions 
(see section 2.3.2) will fall under the above Article while its commercial activities do 
not.166  
From economic point of view it is advisable to split the central and commercial banking 
roles of the NBE and to focus on the former. This is because the bank lacks the necessary 
resources to do both and the main problem of Ethiopian financial service sector is not lack 
of public FIs but the lack of information, competition and efficient regulation. Ethiopia has 
the third-highest public investment-to-GDP ratio in the world and the sixth-lowest private-
investment-to-GDP ratio.167 If Ethiopia aspires sustainable development, it must involve 
the private sector and that cannot be achieved without a strong central bank. Besides, if 
Ethiopia joins the WTO, these difficulties will get worse and hence the NBE should focus 
on how to solve those problems than direct commercial involvement.168  
Looking at other challenges that the NBE neededs to address, we have inflation in the first 
place. The bank has pursued tight monetary policy focusing on strengthening the domestic 
resource mobilization but the problem has gotten worse.169 Moreover, Ethiopia has a fiscal 
deficit of 2% of GDP and foreign exchange reserves shortage for almost two months’ of 
import coverage. Meanwhile the stock of external debt as a ratio of GDP has reached 
24.3%.170 Ethiopian FIs should also play a leading role in adopting modern technologies to 
be able to bring their products and services as near as the hands of their customers, and this 
requires the initiative and leadership of the NBE.171 If the NBE focuses on its regulatory 
role with all its resources then it will be in a better position to deal with the above mentio-
ned challenges.  
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3.4.2 Addressing corruption 
Combating corruption is another challenge for the growth of Ethiopian financial sector.172 
Corruption perceptions index that measures public corruption ranked Ethiopia 111 out of 
175 countries in 2013. The Ministry of Justice and the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission are charged with combating corruption and since its establishment the 
Commission has arrested dozens of officials including managers of the Privatization 
Agency, Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation, NBE, CBE, and Ethiopian Revenue 
and Customs Authority.173Clearly, there is a lot to be done by the GOE in this regard 
especially in relation to mode 2 financial service supply by foreign FIs (see section 3.3.2). 
3.4.3 Proper sequencing of measures  
From the experience of DCs in the WTO appropriate sequencing of reforms is essential.174 
For instance, despite extensive financial sector reforms, Sub-Sahara African financial sys-
tems faced serious inefficiency.175 Countries that strengthened the supervisory and regula-
tory framework prior to liberalization succeeded far better than those that liberalized 
first.176 Where prudential regulation was weak, FIs became over exposed to high risks and 
collapsed while countries with good macroeconomic policies and stabilization programs in 
place achieved more success.177Simply, achieving macroeconomic stability and 
strengthening financial sector regulation are intertwined processes with financial liberaliza-
tion.178 For instance, capital controls should be relaxed only after the financial sector re-
forms and effective regulatory capacities are in place.179 Service sector liberalization and 
domestic regulatory reform must go forward in a parallel and unified path so that liberaliza-
tion does not occur faster than the necessary regulatory reform in service sectors that are 
susceptible to specific types of market failure. Thus, the Ethiopian government is expected 
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to set appropriate sequencing and moderating infrastructure parallel to market liberalization 
efforts.180 
3.4.4 Utilize regional integration, BTAs and GSPs  
WTO is only one option and opportunity for members without precluding other alternatives 
and privileges. For instance, regional integration among DCs, which can serve as a learning 
stage of weighing the benefits and costs of multilateral integration, is another alternative 
for Ethiopia.181  It can avoid the adverse effects of integration by restricting the invol-
vement of non-members.182 Promoting the exchange of cultures and civilization, peace and 
security and creating economies of scale via market access opportunities are some of its 
benefits. Moreover, improving the supervision and regional laws that govern financial acti-
vities among states with the same level of development and common vision is easier than at 
multilateral level especially for states with less bargaining power.183 It is also more feasible 
for Ethiopian FIs to create comparative advantage at regional level as they can compete 
better with institutions that are situated in similar circumstances.184 
However, in reality, financial service trade among DCs have more constraints than trade 
among developing and developed countries, and five times more barriers than trade among 
developed countries.185 Financial service trade accounted only for 6% of all trade on mer-
chandise and 10% of all trade in services globally.186 Poor infrastructure, lack of technolo-
gy and know-how, poor regulatory and institutional framework, macro-economic instabili-
ty, lack of currency convertibility, lack of political commitment and corruption are major 
causes for such week regional trade relations among DCs. Large size of the public sector, 
political instability and conflicts, lack of good governance are other setbacks.187  
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In particular, Ethiopia’s financial service export is limited. Looking at Ethiopian trade part-
ners Europe takes the lead while Africa is the third.188 Similarly inside COMESA, Ethiopia 
stood 8th in exports and 10th in imports and this shows its poor link and limited use of re-
gional trade arrangements.189 This fact is worse when it comes to the financial service 
supply where Africa is the least connected and Ethiopia is the most closed. Based on these 
facts, Regional integration in Africa can neither serve as a pretext to deny multilateral libe-
ralization nor is enough in itself. Therefore, the GOE should make more effort to utilize 
regional opportunities.  
BTAs and GSP are other options or opportunities of Ethiopia but the associated problem is 
that big powers use these mechanisms to exert the pressure of their trading interests that 
cannot be achieved multilaterally. Besides, BTAs are mostly conditional and that goes 
beyond trade interests and are more favorable for developed states as DCs have weak bar-
gaining power. For instance, DCs committed more FTAs with developed countries when 
much of their trade in manufactured goods enters rich-country markets with duty-free 
GSPs.190 Moreover, GSPs, which are meant to help LDCs, are not always benevolent and 
easy to squeeze their juice. This is because, first, the beneficiaries are unable to match the 
trading benefits of donors.191 Second, there are many beneficiaries leading to trade divis-
ions and declining preference margins. Third, donors often attach side conditions that are 
trade unrelated and their implementation create substantial element of reciprocity.192 
Fourth, GSPs are uncertain and temporary that can be unilaterally modified or revoked at 
anytime. Therefore, the GOE should contiunue an elegant use of GSPs and BTAs re-
gardless of its accession to the WTO.   
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3.4.5 Encourage competition 
If Ethiopian FIs can be supported by the gymnastics of competition- consumers’ best fri-
end- the financial system would be stronger and more resilient to shocks. Here, relaxing 
entry requirements for FIs, reducing bureaucratic hurdles and creating efficient legal 
framework are important. Furthermore, having effective competition policy to reduce con-
centration and incontestability is crucial. There is also a need to strengthen the supervisory 
authority, improve the quality of financial information, and launch capital markets to give 
additional options of investment for savers.193 That is why the IMF mission that visited 
Ethiopia on June 2014 stressed on the need for encouraging the private sector and impro-
ving competition, comprehensive financial information and reduction of public borrowing 
from domestic sources.194 
From experience, privatization in DCs is successful in promoting competition, increasing 
productivity, satisfying consumer needs and achieving economic growth.195 The same is 
true for financial sector openness.196 The key elements of financial openness are domestic 
market competition, foreign ownership, and limited capital controls, all of which are lack-
ing in Ethiopia at present.197 The inefficiency of Ethiopian public FIs, restrictive regulatory 
framework and prohibition of foreign entry in the financial service activities are offsetting 
the positive effects of financial intermediation and the growth of the sector. Therefore, to 
achieve the objectives of financial liberalization in Ethiopia, improving competition and 
continuation of liberalization tasks is required including calculated journey to the WTO. 
3.4.6 Involve the private sector  
One of the main reasons for the GOE’s reluctance to join the WTO is the potential danger 
the domestic private sector might face (infant industry argument). However, the private 
sector has not been properly involved in the accession process (see section 1.2). Besides, 
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the private sector does not share all the GOE’s fear towards financial sector liberalization. 
According to a study made by ECCSA, all Ethiopian domestic banks and insurances agree 
to the full opening of the Mode 2 with capital controls and the opening of the Mode 4 with 
qualification-requirements and limits on the number of employees. Their positions vary 
regarding cross-border supply of financial services and commercial presence. Majority of 
them agree to the opening of Mode 1 with domestic regulation and in the areas where they 
do not operate.198 They are also interested in the opening of mode 3 in areas where they do 
not operate with domestic regulation and a transitional period of 5-10 years. Most of them 
agree to the requirement of joint venture with a maximum of 49% foreign equity participa-
tion and foreign-domestic management mix in proportion to capital contribution.199 Some 
of them agree to the opening of conditional green-field investment. Similarly, being un-
happy about the current performance of Ethiopian financial service sector, several custo-
mers believe that allowing the entry of foreign competitors into the Ethiopian market along 
with building the capacities of domestic FIs can enhance the competition and quality of the 
sector.200Therefore, Ethiopian FIs and consumers are more or less positive towards finan-
cial liberalization and the GOE must advocate their interest in its negotiation.   
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4 Conclusions 
The GOE has been cautious towards financial liberalization although reforms like pri-
vatization has taken place since 1992, which increased the number of FIs, their branches, 
and financial products-portfolio.201 However, the sector, which is reserved for domestic 
investors, is still at the early stage of development.202 The state is acceding to the WTO 
since 2003 and the liberalization of the financial service sector has been the most sensitive 
part for the GOE. Liberalization in the context of GATS should, of course, be analyzed 
considering how it will fit into Ethiopian overall reality, development objectives, and its 
impact on different modes of financial service supply. This is because the result of such 
reforms does not depend on the mere existence of the process but on how it fits with such 
legal and economic needs.  
Following WTO accession all members have allowed foreign FIs’ entry, which mostly led 
to an increased competition, better intermediation and improved transfer of technology. 
However, not all members allowed 100% foreign ownership and foreign FIs to freely ope-
rate in capital movements and foreign currencies. In some cases, poor macroeconomic per-
formance, weak policy environment, political instability and corruption had prevented such 
positive outcomes.203 Basically, WTO offers both opportunities and risks. It is up to mem-
bers to make the best out of it by combining strategies of negotiation, and addressing do-
mestic regulatory and related problems. Accession to the WTO will change the rules of 
business making by strengthening the forces of the market204 and that is a good opportunity 
for Ethiopia who stood 125th out of 189 countries based on ease of doing business 2014 
index.205 
Liberalization commitment schedules have tended to become more complex over time. 
However, there is no common policy regarding the extent of commitments in the financial 
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sub-sectors and different countries responded differently towards external pressure. The 
special treatment scheme for LDCs has not been applied practically in accession negotia-
tions.206 However, Ethiopia should try to benefit from such flexibilities. 
Ethiopian financial sector, which is dominated by the banking industry and public FIs is 
one of the least developed in the world. The regulatory body i.e. NBE is inefficient and has 
set inhibitive requirements on FIs during establishment and operation. Lack of capital and 
money markets, limited accessibility in rural areas and shortage of products portfolio are 
other problems. The sector is totally closed from commercial presence of foreign FIs in 
mode 3, slightly open in mode 1 and 4, where as there is no clear regulation regarding mo-
de 2. 
Looking at the Ethiopian accession negotiation and potential commitment scenarios for the 
financial service sector, commercial presence and cross-border supply are the focal issues.  
Conditional liberalization of mode 1; full liberalization of mode 2; foreign FIs’ commercial 
presence in Ethiopia through branches, equity participation and/or subsidiaries in mode 3; 
and allowing conditional presence of foreign natural persons in Ethiopia to deliver financial 
services in mode 4 seems the most feasible combination of scenarios that allows Ethiopia 
to take advantage of the liberalization process while simultaneously minimizing the spill-
over risks and challenges. 
Finally, acceding to the WTO alone will not enable Ethiopia to achieve growth in the fi-
nancial service sector or economically. Therefore, the GOE should equally pay attention to 
solving domestic problems of regulation, corruption and lack of competition. It should also 
exploit other alternatives and opportunities like RTAs, BTAs and GSPs. 
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